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This paper examines the relationship between law and compassion from the perspective of 
two diverse scholars. For philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, rejecting the idea homo homini 
lupus, there can simply be no organized society but for a primordial, unauthorized, human 
vocation for compassion (egoism and violence, for him, are nothing but attempts to repress 
this). Levinas, however, must be understood, as speaking of compassion not in the usual 
sense, that is as involving a human capacity for, and cultures of, empathy; he defines it, 
rather, in phenomenological terms, as an irreducible excess of affectivity for the ultimately 
meaningless suffering of another, beyond all theodicy and causality, whom one is ethically 
commanded to offer succour to as if s/he is a ‘higher’ and absolutely unique Other, prior to 
any comparison and judgement. General legal principles and rigorous rules, Natural Justice 
and positive law are equally ‘born’ of such an-archic, individuated, compassion for which 
one can only retroactively account. Justice is ‘born’ as one attempts to justify to third 
parties why one’s care benefits some but not others; the paper argues that this perspective 
is preferable to prioritizing empathic compassion over law for it binds compassion with 
responsibility.  Turning to Giorgio Agamben, the role of compassion takes on a darker 
character; his historicized investigations of the ‘western-Christian’ paradigm shows how the 
Greek and Roman legal principles of epieikeia, and aequitas merged with the Christian 
postulates of God-dictated philanthropy and ‘divine economy’ (Gr: oikonomia), leading –
instead of ethical anarchy followed by with infinite responsibility  (Levinas) – to anomie, 
legal exceptionalism and social control via patronage and other bio-political practices to 
spectacles of compassion. This suggests that what Levinas calls ‘ethical anarchy’ has been 
captured by economic rationality and endless processes of anomic management that are 
equally free of ethical constraints as they are from legal and political decision. With 
reference to contemporary examples from the ‘law and emotion’ debates, medical laws and 
humanitarianism, the paper asks the reader to ponder upon the importance, if any, of 
Levinas’ thesis in a world where the expediency of managerial rationality, the secular heir of 




                                                 
1
 Reader in law, Birkbeck College; m.diamantides@bbk.ac.uk 




While some marginalise and others emphasise the importance of the emotion of 
compassion as an aspect of legal justice each of the two continental philosophers examined 
here offer a distinctive perspective. 
 
  For Emmanuel Levinas compassion is not to be studied as part of a philosophy of 
moral feeling or a psychology of empathy but, as a key aspect of an existential, pre-reflexive 
human ‘ethical vocation’ for infinite ethical responsibility towards the other as other, which 
precedes language (and thus consciousness and the unconscious) and which makes possible 
all social phenomena, starting with language. Society presupposes existents that cannot but 
direct thoughtless compassion at specific others who ‘obsess’ us causing us to act without 
thought for third persons. Justice is born as we reflect upon this anarchic privileging of only 
some and strive to account for it before all those third others. Legal as well as political 
justice are the domains in which said striving takes place continuously and inconclusively. In 
sum, for Levinas, compassion is both the irreducibly ‘anarchic’ condition of possibility of 
sociality and a source of embarrassment that causes us to try and deal with others 
dispassionately for instance by recourse to general principles of legal or social justice. This 
effort is inconclusive and never-ending in so far as critique reveals that such dispassionate 
sobriety is always found lacking, that is, in so far as we are exposed as caring for some more 
than others (our children, our fellow-citizens, those whose suffering we can empathise 
with). In this sense compassion is both the reason for and the limit of theories of justice (for 
example, as is well known, in John Rawls’ Justice as Fairness the application of principles of 
equality and liberty that are meant to ensure that the "least advantaged" are benefitted and 
not hurt or forgotten, rests on the presumption of a “veil of ignorance.” But while the latter 
may be efficacious on the level of conscious cognizance, this is not necessarily the case once 
we consider the psychanalytic category of the unconscious or the Levinasian category of 
‘ethical vocation’.) 
 
Moving from Levinas’s universalist ethics to Giorgio Agamben’s genealogical study of 
the bio-political Western-Christian legal and political paradigm the emphasis on compassion 
remains even if in an entirely different sense. As explained above, Levinas depicts anarchic 
compassion as the condition of all sociality which legal and political philosophies try to 
structure and justify. By contrast, Agamben argues that specifically in the Christian and post-
Christian Western imagination compassion signifies as an instance anarchic economy that is 
assumed as always already ‘justified’ because providential not only in theology but also in 
political theology. A part of his historicised argument is that the related Greek and Roman 
legal principles of epieikeia and aequitas merged, in Christian Byzantium, with the postulate 
of providential ‘divine economy’ (Gr: oikonomia) in a way that serves to justify legal 
exceptionalism or/and social control via pastoralism. Thus, we must beware lest spectacles 
of selective suffering and compassion are used to justify the ad hoc suspension of the rigor 
of domestic or international laws, for instance in relation to ‘humanitarian’ interventions. 
Equally, compassion should not be an excuse for populist politicians offering selective 
patronage and the usual gap between their electoral promises and post-electoral policy u-
turns.  
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This paper reads Agamben’s thesis as suggesting that, at least in the Western legal 
and political paradigm, what Levinas calls compassion’s ‘ethical anarchy’ is  instrumentalised  
at the expense of both the rule of law and of democracy, and in favor of bio-politics and 
anomic management. With reference to contemporary examples from the ‘law and 
emotion’ debates, medical law and humanitarianism, the paper asks the reader to ponder 
upon the importance, if any, of Levinas’ ethical thesis  in a world where the expediency of 
managerial rationality, the secular heir of divine providential oikonomia, prevails over 
moral, legal and political principle in all but name. 
 
II. ‘Law is born to anarchic compassion’: an ethical relation. 
 
‘Is not the evil of suffering… also the un-assumable, whence the possibility of a half 
opening that a moan, a cry, a groan or a sigh slips through – the original call for aid, for 
curative help, help from the other me whose alterity, whose exteriority promises 
salvation? […] For pure suffering, which is intrinsically senseless and condemned to itself 
with no way out, a beyond appears in the form of the inter-human.’ (Levinas, 2001, pp. 
165-166.)  
 
Emmanuel Levinas wrote that legal and political judgements are ‘born of charity…’ 
(Levinas, 2001, pp. 165-166); to understand that we have to also take on board his view that 
at the ‘diachronic’ level, society is not reducible to either economy, politics, law or religion 
all of which are meaningful at the ‘synchronic level”. To say that, diachronically and 
universally, legal and political systems are ‘born of charity…’ is to presuppose an irreducible, 
as well as inescapable, existential human vocation for asymmetrical openness to and 
hospitality for the vulnerable other. Throughout history sectarian religions with the help of 
theodicies, have provided suffering with meaning and justifications. In Levinas’ atheist 
ethics, however, all suffering is evil beyond meaningfulness and redemption. Strictly 
speaking ‘to suffer’ is to undergo an impact that is too much; it is passivity; it is to be 
subjected to what is too intense for it to be objectified by the suffering self as a coherent 
experience; when for example another steps on my foot, for a split second, I undergo a 
strong sensation without yet reflecting, before I recuperate and can think of what happened 
and pass judgement. Thus, Levinas spoke of suffering as an impasse, an absurdity, and, so, 
utterly ‘useless’ (Levinas, 1998, pp. 91-101), Now, in so far as such pure, pre-reflective, 
meaningless, suffering that shows in the face of the unfortunate other is witnessed, it is a 
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“scandal”; the witness, scandalized by meaninglessness, is thus prompted to reach out to 
the sufferer: either to provide succours or to try and hide it. Although Levinas sometimes 
called this ‘compassion’ he more regularly called it gratuitous responsibility for useless 
suffering; this is not empathy (which some people feel more than others) but an inescapable 
human condition: to care for the other. Unconditional hospitality and succour of the 
suffering other are offered, as one of two possible options, when confronted with a 
scandalous shameful realisation: (i) first, the realization of non-interchangeability and 
alterity: although it is totally reasonable to assume that another person enjoys and suffers 
in ways similar to mine, I cannot enjoy or suffer in his or her place; (ii) second, the 
embarrassment that comes with the realization that, simply by occupying ‘a place under the 
sun’ I/we displace another or rob them of a possible refuge (consider the current European 
immigration crisis). Indifference is not an option; the only alternative to offering hospitality 
and succors is violence against the disturbingly suffering other: examples abound in history 
with the Nazi’s treatment of the ill still fresh in our memory; but the elimination of the 
sufferer so as to avoid exposure to the absurdity of suffering is an ultimately vain attempt to 
remove the embarrassment; even when the sufferer dies – the mind goes to those refugees 
drowning in the Mediterranean sea  –  or is locked out of sight  –  say in a closed refugee 
camp  – her ghost continues to haunt us.  
 
To gauge the relevance, if any, of Levinas’ take on compassion qua inescapable, 
gratuitous responsibility for useless or ‘absurd’ suffering to contemporary secular and non-
fascist political and legal orders, Levinasian terminology must be first be introduced and 
explained. A central role in his godless metaphysics is played by the expression face-to-face 
which connotes a pre-reflective phase of human proximity; irrespectively of what I can make 
of a neighbour her ‘face’ signifies pure irreducible alterity and demands to be cared for as if 
s/he was an absolutely unique and also higher ‘Other’; it cannot be stressed enough that 
such proximity refers to a pre-reflexive experience of sociality which the daily confrontation 
with any empirical others’ face epitomizes; starting with the parent’s face whose 
unintelligible voice commands the infant and summons it to come out of its stupor and 
become a responsive human. It is from this primacy of affectivity over reflexivity that 
Levinas derives the ‘irreducibly ethical’ dimension of his face-to-face ethics. The capital ‘O’ 
of the term ‘Other’ suggests that the encounter with an empirical other produces an 
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affective surplus over the idea and image ‘of’ said other held by myself/my community.  
Though knowable, as member of a species or genus, the absurdly vulnerable or actually 
uselessly suffering other obsesses me as ‘Other’ through her ‘disincarnate’ face, that is:  as a 
unique site of vulnerability or subjection to meaningless suffering in excess of identity, 
essence, representation, knowledge and meaning and, hence, of theodicy and causality. 
Consequently, in the here and now of every encounter with a concrete being – even if this is 
taking place in the very formal setting of the law court – its ‘naked’, uniquely vulnerable, 
Face ‘summons’ me/us not as a knowing ‘I’/ ‘we’ and self-same subject (for example, the 
legal judge or the social worker as professional or/and as a particular kind of psychic 
structures with specific inclinations, biases etc.) but the individual/collective Self as Me/Us 
in the accusative – an ethically individuated subjectivity called forth by the other whose 
suffering I/we cannot ultimate reduce to a matter of theodicy or scientific causality. Every 
suffering, no matter how caused, even self-inflicted, concerns me/us personally as a 
‘scandal’. This scandal signifies the situation of our proximity as inescapably personal no 
matter how formal or mediated the setting, and proscribes me/us with an ‘infinite’ and 
‘anarchic’, pre-reflective (thus pre-legal, pre-political, pre-religious) responsibility for the 
other’s ‘nakedness’ (that is, vulnerability to suffering) in excess of law, politics, religion etc. 
This is producing a ‘counter-intentional’ affectivity in the adult subject who feels responsible 
for a ‘unique’ Other even as it knows him/her to be comparable and interchangeable. In 
sum, Levinas’ phenomenological terms the Self as ethical subjectivity, or Me (by extension 
Us), refers to a pre-conscious, pre-reflexive, non-intentional, state of affectivity in which 
both the conceptual and iconic distinctions ‘self-other’ are not yet established or, if they 
are, they implode; hence the individual/collective ethical subjectivity as me/us is 
distinguished from the idea of the singular/collective ‘ego’ of self-same identity (‘I’/’we’) 
that includes consciousness and ‘the unconscious’.  
 
In turn, one must ask, who is my/our neighbour who compels me/us to gratuitous 
concern with alleviating their pain as a matter of priority? Anyone with a ‘face’, answers 
Levinas, including Bobby the dog!2 No matter how near or far in spatio-temporal or even 
                                                 
2
 Bobby the dog strayed into the German camp where Levinas was held during the war and unlike the Nazis 
continued to treat the prisoners as human. ‘This dog was the last Kantian in Nazi Germany, without the brain 
needed to universalise maxims and drives’ (Levinas, 2015, p. 153). 
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species terms each vulnerable/suffering other demands my/our exclusive attention as if 
s/he or it was the only one that matters. Realizing this makes me/us question the possibility 
of authority of, say, legal precedent or consensual political desideratum, be they based on 
categorical imperative, utilitarian calculus or an idea of the end of History as the overcoming 
of contradictions (in either its neo-liberal version; for example, Fukuyama, or neo-Marxist 
versions; for example, Žižek, Badiou, Balibar). In critical jurisprudence Levinasian ethics has 
thus allied with deconstruction (Critchley, 2014 [1992]). For example, using Levinasian 
terms, I have written of the face of the permanently vegetative patient (PVS) in English 
medical law (Diamantides, 2000a, 2000b; 2000c). Unclassifiable as either alive or dead, 
known to harbour no thoughts or feelings yet commanding responsibility for his absurd and 
‘useless’ suffering, the PVS patient in the leading UK case of Airedale N.H.S. Trust v Bland3 
stretched the judges’ ability to authorize their decision through use of a patient’s ‘best 
interests’ test found in a dissimilar case concerning a fully sentient mentally-ill person which 
was nevertheless accepted as the most relevant legal precedent. Reading the summary of 
the judgment one is struck that the patient’s alterity spoke through the gap between, on the 
one hand, their personal judgements (in which most judges admitted that in the case of PVS 
patients there is no ‘interest’ to speak of in either continuing to be in this state or not) and, 
on the other hand, the final, ‘authoritative’ judgment that states that it was in the 
vegetating patient’s interests to be left to die because he had no interests to speak of! If I 
focus on the incongruity of this decision it is because their failure to properly justify their 
decision exposes the judges personal ethical and gratuitous responsibility for the fate of the 
PVS patient. By contrast, any justification in terms of law or policy for why this particular 
patient is better off let go, or not, immediately raises the suspicion that some partial 
economy of compassion is presumed in which some sufferings matter more or less than 
others.   What the discourse of both law and policy will not  entertain is precisely what 
Levinas referred to: the idea of human intimacy as ‘ethical subjectivities’ namely in terms of 
each existent’s ‘obsession’ with gratuitous, impossible responsibility for each other’s absurd 
suffering; without authority nor limit each empirical other primarily commands me/us as if 
utterly unique, incomparable or ‘absolute Other’, to the point of ‘persecution,’ destabilizing 
individual and collective self-consciousness and shaming identitarian closure.  
                                                 
3
 [1993] A.C. 789. 
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To appreciate Levinas’ admittedly complex thesis one must do no less than set aside 
key assumptions in the dominant paradigm of legal and political anthropology; that legal 
and political institutions were created by man in order to ‘put an end’, or at least to give 
meaning or a useful structure, to suffering and violence; and that man is either absolutely 
free in his relations with the world and the possibilities that solicit action from him 
(idealism), or mere prey to material needs (reductivist materialism). In Levinas’ materialist 
metaphysics the human is neither free spirit nor bound matter but an existent that 
experiences the absoluteness of materially-based individual and social existence 
dramatically, as an unbearable ‘burden,’ or an inescapable contract into which s/he never 
voluntarily entered. It is on the basis of such premises that Levinas analysed human society 
in terms of the face-to-face as ‘primary sociality’ (Levinas, 1969, p. 304) ‘…whose whole 
intensity consists in not presupposing the idea of community’ (Hand, 2001, pp. 83-84) but, 
instead, the idea of infinity (Levinas, 1969). The idea of infinity, per Levinas, obsesses us 
even as it is a signifier without a signified; it is, rather, experienced in the flesh as an excess 
of affectivity and responsibility over knowable and calculable duty in the onerous, indeed 
unaffordable, proximity to the face of my/our neighbour who, in terms of my/our ethical 
responsibility, comes complete with the claim of having to be approached as if absolutely 
unique and as if, therefore, ‘higher’ rather than as another member of the genus to which 
s/he or it might belong. The idea of infinity as a sign of such godless transcendence is central 
to Levinas’ ethics of proximity, based, as it is on obsessively dedicating one’s self to the 
other who is approached as if s/he was absolutely Other. Thus sociality is the result of an 
infinite ethical command: open up to the stranger! Obviously this is quite distinct both from 
constructing a community out of an egocentric perspective or, alternatively, an ego out of a 
conventionalist or social point of view and from master-slave type dialectic.  Because of this, 
Levinasian ethics is at odds with any ontology of the state or any other political association 
since it exposes the contingency of sociality and demystifies/denaturalizes any existing 
bonds.  
 
Overall, Levinas’ ethical ontology of society entails: (i) a fundamental pre-reflexive, 
pre-political and pre-legal, human experience of anarchically welcoming each other as an 
important stranger; and of obsession with the stranger’s always ‘absurd’ (meaningless and 
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thus incalculable and incomparable) suffering; (ii) bearing the burden of, subsequently, 
reflecting on this experience, comparing sufferings and attributing causes, and justifying to 
third parties why this or that instance of suffering mattered to me/us while another was 
neglected. This double limit to the (individual or collective) ego’s sovereignty (an 
existential/ethical ‘impulse’ and social/justice-related need to justify it) is supposed by 
Levinas to be more fundamental than, and irreducible into, any idea of moral duty either in 
particular religions – traditional or ‘civil’ – or in universalist ‘secular’ philosophies such as 
Kant’s or Hegel’s. Thus, in Levinas’ scheme, the traditional Western binary model of relating 
law (understood as the domain of rationality) and compassion (seen as an irrational 
emotion) – namely first distinguishing them and then seeking to balance one against the 
other – is set aside, in favour of a model based on genesis (of law/politics born to 
compassion) and forgetfulness (legal and political discourses forget their anarchical birth by 
compassion). In particular, modern legal and political philosophies forget that both legal and 
political judgments are ‘born of charity…’, as instances of anarchic responsiveness in the 
numerous daily events of ‘face-to-face’ sociality where each empirical (singular or collective) 
‘other’ obsesses the (singular or collective) ‘self’ as if s/he were the only one that matters.  
 
Said differently, what we tend to forget is that legal or political justice proceed from 
the individuated, daily human experience of a pre-reflexive, obsessive, hyperbolic, extra-
legal and extra-political, anarchic ethical obligation to open up to and alleviate another’s 
suffering as always meaningless and absurd (that is, irrespectively of any theodicy or natural 
causality) and ‘as if unique’ (prior to any comparison and calculation). As soon as by 
political/legal ‘justice’ and right’ we mean a public reasoned discourse of measured and 
accountable sociability, however, one must account for what now can appear to third 
parties (‘the Third’ in Levinas’ jargon) to be merely one’s compassionate predilections; 
hence the importance of publicly demonstrating that one treats equally, or at least 
equitably, comparable cases. One simply can’t say: ‘I did x for y outside the frame of extant 
law because my conscience so demanded’ unless one is prepared to die like Antigone did. 
On the other hand, human laws rarely demand of us to justify why we empathize with and 
care for ‘our own’ (our children, our friends, our compatriots) more than for others (in 
Genesis, God, the religious version of the absolute Other, did ask Abraham to love him to 
the point of sacrificing his son; in human history this demand is almost always repeated by 
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the collective, in the form of sacrificing ourselves and our children in war against others, but 
never for others, save in recent ‘humanitarian wars’ of which I write below). 
 
If indeed our established legal and political orders tend to ‘forget’ that inter-human 
compassion is their condition of possibility, rather than the other way around, however, 
Levinas did not propose that remembering alone suffices to reverse this situation. In other 
words, his was not a plea for a return to some version of natural law prioritized over 
positive law. Rather, he described the relation of ethics to law/politics as an interminable 
existential drama with ethical consequences. For example, I spoke above of those British 
judges in the Bland case who tried but failed to hide their personal ethical responsibility for 
the PVS patient. The failure shows amply in the absurd statement, made by one judge, that 
ending his life is in conformity with his ‘best interests’ (the legal precedent) because he has 
no interests to speak of whatsoever.  At such moments, as Levinas put it, the (individual or 
collective) Self as ethical subjectivity (‘Me’/’Us’) appears ‘in the form of an ego, 
anachronously delayed behind its present moment, and unable to recuperate this delay – 
that is, in the form of an ego unable to conceive what is “touching” it’ (Levinas, 1999, p. 
101). It is in such diachronic circumstances that any particular other appears as an 
awesome, unique, ‘higher’, Other whose suffering requires us to risk providing succors, and 
that my/our Ego (say, as judges bound to follow, not make, the law) is left shocked, 
speechless, humbled, its self-referentiality interrupted. Thus the ‘me/us’ connotes the 
(individual or collective) Ego as constituted in persecution by and obsession with ‘alterity.’ 
This, Levinas argued, gives rise to the only truly universal, human right-cum-duty to 
responsibility which, anarchically, dislodges the rational quest to determine once and for all 
the right ‘relation’ of law/politics and compassion. In other words acting compassionately 
can only retain an ‘ethical’ character if the subject is understood as individually responsible 
for having failed to authorize its compassion with reference to a theory that settles or 
synthesizes its legal/political responsibility with its anarchic desire to act compassionately.  
 
The fact that we become social animals out of inescapable, gratuitous, individuate 
compassion that fails to be justified but that, subsequently, we tend to think of society as 
our, or our ancestors’, (political/legal) accomplishment is an important aspect of our 
existential condition. At its most fundamental level, however, the Self (‘I’ or ‘we’) does not 
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only ‘mirror itself’ in the facts of the knowable and comparable others around it where the 
distinctions I/you, us/they pertain. It remains confronted with the radical alterity of each 
other before it who demands to be treated as if the only ‘Other’ that matters at that 
instance, demanding compassion. If so, selfhood should not be understood as it is normally, 
that is, as the sum-total of its actual and potential, conscious and unconscious, intentions, 
namely as the ‘sovereign,’ self-same, point of identity. Underneath the ‘veneer’ of said 
sovereign self (‘I’/‘we’) lies an ethically persecuted me/us before each and every proximate 
vulnerable other who demands our exclusive care.  In this sense the (individual or collective) 
self is neither an actor or a non-actor but the unique locus of inescapable ‘radical passivity’: 
a Levinasian neologism that aims to convey the inoperability of the normal distinction 
activity-passivity in the exposure to an other-as-Other facing me/us – and no one else – and 
commanding me/us neither to act nor to stay indifferent but to become a Self-for-the-other, 
or to be-for-the-other, to open up to alterity and offer succors to whoever suffers. In Europe 
today, for instance, the question regarding the refugees’ crisis is not ‘what should we 
do/not do?’ but: who must we Europeans become now that many strangers show up, 
exposing their vulnerability to our sight? Thus, the ‘I’/ ‘we’ is relational not only in a 
dialectical sense but hyperbolically, since in my/our exposure to another’s face ‘I’ am me 
and ‘we’ are us in the accusative, that is by virtue of my/our obligation to another: ‘as if I 
were devoted to the other man before being devoted to myself’ (Hand, 1989, p. 34). Apart 
from deconstructive readings of the law this perspective has also had already a (hitherto 
modest) reconstructive impact on jurisprudence. As Desmond Manderson puts it: in just the 
way that Levinas sees ethics as ‘first philosophy’, so, in (the common) law, the status of ‘first 
law’ should be attributed to the law of torts and the so-called ‘duty of care’ (which describes 
a personal responsibility that we owe to others and which has been placed on us without 
our consent) (Manderson, 2006, p. 206). The wider implication is that, instead of assuming 
that the law has its basis on individual rights, freedom, autonomy and contract, we can see 
it as based on the individual’s un-chosen obligations, where their autonomy and freedom 
are questioned. This model reverses the sequential precedence afforded to the austerity of 
law over compassion in all dominant Western accounts. I will come back to the 
deconstructive and reconstructive uses of Levinas in critical jurisprudence in the conclusion.  
 
Coming to the matter at hand, I submit, the Levinasian premise of an anarchic 
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compassion in the form not of empathy but of a gratuitous and excessive ethical 
responsibility for ‘useless suffering’ overcomes some of the most serious problems 
associated with compassion as empathy whereby the latter is understood, contrary to 
Levinas, as a quality of the ego and its counter-part, the ‘unconscious.’ First, whereas: 
‘[w]hat renders the “I forgive you” sometimes unsupportable or odious... is the affirmation 
of sovereignty’;4 and whilst: ‘[t[he power to pardon is but the counterpart of the power to 
condemn’ (DiSalle, 1964, pp. 71, 74); Levinas spoke of compassion for the other as a non-
power that makes possible the legal and political sovereignty to condemn/pardon this or 
that person only to expose it as lacking in justice vis-à-vis  third persons. Secondly, his thesis 
neutralizes without negating Hannah Arendt’s criticism of those who wish to substitute 
reasoned debate, decision and action by the ‘rash decisions and thoughtless actions’ 
expressing the ‘boundless emotion’ or ‘passion’ of compassion (Arendt, 1963, pp. 70-90).  
 
If Levinas is right that any legal/political justice always presupposes anarchic 
compassion, there is no need, in order to be compassionate, to imitate Jesus who came ‘not 
to destroy but fulfil the law’ and make exceptions or discounts to the extant law. Thus, for 
example, the manner in which, in the last few decades, aggressive military expeditions in 
contravention of international law have been exceptionally justified as ‘humanitarian’ and, 
eventually, have been accepted as a new species of legal intervention, without proper 
debate, is not something that we could defend with reference to Levinasian ethics. Rather, 
the latter’s insistence that one can never fully justify one’s concern for an instance of 
suffering means that, in his scheme, it is precisely such unjustifiable concern that gives rise 
to the necessity to justify it in the eyes of third others. This, however, is a conversation that 
can never end:  if the very law in our disposal is always already born to charity we need to 
set aside the lies we tell about its ‘foundations’ and acknowledge that all law is destined to 
remain as unfounded, as charity is anarchic; we can never truly justify why we prioritize the 
suffering and vulnerability of some (say of our own children, or compatriots etc.) over 
others’. In sum, while Levinas wrote of the ontological primacy of the ‘anarchy’ of 
compassion over legal and political right, he did not advocate anarchism. All he suggested, I 
                                                 
4
Jacques Derrida, ‘The Century and the Pardon’, Le Mondes des Debats, No. 9 (December, 1999), 16: 
http://hydra.humanities.uci.edu/derrida/siecle.html (accessed  on 1 August 2016). 
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understand, is that right does not proceed from might but from the weakness of man and 
that it is not a formula; as we try and fail to account for our compassionate predilections we 
construct vulnerable, de-constructible and necessary visions of (legal and political) justice. 
 
III. Law and compassion in the Western theo-political tradition: an economic/anomic 
relation? 
 
As we saw, Levinas felt the need to argue that law and politics are born of an ethically 
demanded anarchic compassion, which they subsequently attempt to retroactively 
authorize. I am turning now to a very different thinker, Giorgio Agamben, who defends the 
thesis that in the western tradition, at least since Christianization, the prevailing rationality 
is only ostensibly one which centers on legal and political authority (Agamben, 1998; 2000; 
2004; 2010; 2011; 2013; 2016); in reality, he argues, the prevailing mode of governance is 
administrative/managerial and anomic. Juxtaposing these diverse theories is interesting 
since the relation of ‘ethical anarchy’ to legal/political authority, central in Levinas’ account, 
may turn out, from an Agambian perspective, to be one of un-ethical anomie. Moreover, as 
I presently discuss, in Giorgio Agamben’s historical account of the Western (Greek-Roman-
Christian) legal and political paradigm the issue of the relation of law to compassion gets 
special mention and acquires a different, darker, character than in Levinas’ a-historical 
ethics. As Agamben points out, Byzantine rulers set the scene when they began to suspend 
laws ostensibly in the name of Christian compassion but, in reality, as part of a shift away 
from Greek democracy, early Roman republicanism and Roman autocracy, towards a bio-
political manner of government (Agamben, 2011); the latter entails strategies for managing 
social life under an anomic, administrative, or ‘economic’ rationality. In this bio-political 
paradigm, which Foucault dated to modernity but Agamben backdates to Byzantine times, 
government dispenses easily with legal or political principle in the name of what Agamben 
calls in Greek oiko-nomia (household management). 
 
 Some key elements of Agamben’s overall approach must be mentioned first. The 
‘western paradigm’ he takes as his object of study comprises: (i) elements derived from 
Greek philosophical metaphysics, especially as filtered via Stoicism; (ii) and the Roman 
statist-juridical legacy especially after it merged with Christianity’s economic-political 
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theology as Agamben defines it. That latter term refers to the idea, in the Trinitarian dogma, 
that God is One yet also three persons, in a way that an all-encompassing unity is predicated 
upon the arrangement of its internal relations. God, and by extension organized society, is 
thus imagined as containing all differences as well as consisting of their organizing 
arrangements. Obviously, such an imagination, to return momentarily to Levinas, does not 
allow for the radically conceived exteriority the latter called ‘alterity’; nor does it allow for 
Levinas’ idea of ‘infinity’ other than as endless process of re-arrangement and management 
of beings and things; nor, lastly, can a religion like Christianity accept Levinas’ thesis that all 
suffering is meaningless, beyond all theodicy and causality, and requires gratuitous 
responsibility: instead all suffering is given an economic meaning and managed accordingly 
(with some sufferings mattering more than others). In as much as Agamben is right, for the 
reasons summarized below, that said economic-political theology still over-determines our 
legal and political imagination in the secular era, the aforementioned Levinasian idea that 
the human condition involves caring for the proximate other’s suffering (or not) in a manner 
and to an extent which always remain un-authorized and, thus, always remain to be further 
and further justified to third parties, has to be revisited. Could it be that in the western 
paradigm – where unity is predicated upon constant anomic management of differences –
what Levinas called the ‘scandal’ of human vulnerability and suffering (that, for him, 
prevents us from being indifferent to meaningless suffering or, said differently, from caring 
only for suffering we empathize with or are legally or politically required to care for) is no 
more? In a tradition where contingency is explained as a set of relations we can master if 
not by decision then at least by management, can any suffering really scandalize us into 
shame and embarrassment simply for occupying a space under the sun instead of another 
and for not being able to suffer in her place as Levinas suggested? 
 
  This composite western paradigm examined by Agamben involves two aspects. 
First, thinking according to a series of binary distinctions inherited from classical 
philosophical metaphysics such as, for our purposes, the binary compassion/law that 
historically derives from the distinction emotion/reason (other such distinctions in classical 
literature are body/mind, zoe/bios, private/public, dynamis/energeia, auctoritas/potestas, 
autonomy/heteronomy, etc.). Ipso facto, as Agamben’s series entitled Homo Sacer makes 
clear, we tend to disregard (or ‘abandon’) any ‘form-of-life’ that cannot be neatly placed on 
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either side of these binary distinctions. In Agamben’s discourse Homo Sacer or ‘bare life’ 
stands precisely for the vulnerability of the human animal that we forget or discount when 
we think in binary terms. Thus, in the aforementioned example from English medical law, 
the PVS patient’s unique vulnerability was lost as the judges tried to represent him either as 
alive or dead (Diamantides, 2000b, 2000c).  The second aspect of the composite western 
paradigm, postulates a third element that encompasses, without dissolving, these binary-
relational encryptions of reality and stabilizes their ‘tension’. The Stoics introduced for this 
purpose the ideas of Logos and Pneuma (Gr: spirit), which were then substituted in the 
medieval period by the Christian postulates of the Triune God but also the idea that the 
world is organized as a huge household (Gr: oikos). In this regard, I have already mentioned 
the possibility that Trinitarianism still over-determines our thinking; as for the idea of the 
world as an oikos it is apposite to say that if this was originally believed to be a house 
‘owned’ by God, later, with secularization, it is the ‘people’ as nation and, now, as 
‘humanity’ that are expected to play the role of house master.  
 
Here, what is important to retain from Agamben’s complex narrative is, first, that in 
the scheme he presents all differences are imagined as contained by the idea of a relational 
unity (according to the image of the Triune who is one and yet consists of the relations of its 
constituent hypostases); and that the classical Greek distinction between the 
oikos/household and polis/politics was enveloped in the Christian imagination by the notion 
of oikonomia; heralding the beginning of bio-politics and managerialism the rise of the 
Trinitarian God and the vision of the social as household gave rise to an imagination 
whereby all binary distinctions – for example, for our purposes: law/compassion – require 
not synthesis or resolution but flexible management and administrative, rather than legal, 
political or ethical rationality. In fact, this (Trinitarian) economic political theology eventually 
made possible, in the sixth or seventh century canon law of the Byzantine Church, a new 
meaning of ‘exception’ (to a rule or principle) referred to as oikonomia. Oikonomia, which in 
classical Greece had meant the a-political administration of a household, had by then 
become the mysterious divine praxis undertaken for the salvation of humankind.5 The 
                                                 
5
 The Byzantine Patriarch Photius, for example, wrote: ‘Oikonomia means precisely the extraordinary and 
incomprehensible incarnation of the Logos …it means the occasional restriction or the suspension of the … 
Page 15 of 26 
 
second lesson from Agamben’s thesis is directly relevant to the discussion at hand. The 
theological idea of exception-as-oikonomia came to coalesce with, respectively, the Greek 
and Roman legal concepts of epieikeia and aequitas, fairness and justice, and ultimately 
came to justify the anomic dispensation (dispensa) that relieves one from too rigid an 
application of the canons in imitation of divine compassion for humanity (Agamben, 2011, 
p. 49). This process marked a shift in the exercise of power in the Byzantine political and 
legal system: dispensation from the law gradually replaced legislation as the main 
expression of sovereignty and Byzantine rulers found it equally expedient to gain legitimacy 
by appearing as merciful Christians, for example by annulling onerous contracts binding the 
meek but also pardoning their corrupt officials.  
 
Now, Agamben is not a historian and what he says about the medieval is supposed to 
help us understand contemporary problems. In fact he is just one among a growing number 
of critics of contemporary liberal democracy and his insights into political theology are 
meant to support his criticism by providing a historicized perspective to today’s crisis of 
legitimacy. Whereas democracy theorists as well as constitutional lawyers like myself speak 
of modern government as based on free, rational, public deliberation, for Agamben and 
others there has not been an effective democracy since classical Athens. Deliberation, he 
claims, has long been substituted, first, by carefully orchestrated ritualistic acclamations of 
the ‘charitable’ sovereign in the medieval era (with the decisive input of religious 
authorities) and, today, by media-manipulated construction of ‘public opinion’ regarding the 
public good (with the decisive input of ‘experts’ – say, on the economy or security). The 
crucial point then and now is that the ‘sovereign’ (be it the Christian monarch or the 
‘people’) do not really rule through their decisions; rather, their decisions follow the 
dictates of those who know or purport to know how ‘to manage’ the situation.6 Today, this 
                                                                                                                                                       
rigor of the laws and the introduction of extenuating circumstances, which "economizes"…the command of 
law in view of the weakness of those who must receive it.’ (Cited in Agamben, 2011, p. 49.) 
6
 Thus, in Byzantium effective power lied not solely with the emperor as ‘legibus solutus’ but also with the 
civil and clerical bureaucracy. Likewise, in the case of the occidental medieval king effective power rested with 
the majordomo of the occidental anointed King. Eventually, as the king’s household servants gradually 
transmuted into a nation-wide civil service and impersonal bureaucracy, the latter’s effective power often 
replaced in all by name the much criticized royal absolutism. At the same time, the western trajectory from the 
High Middle Ages onwards is marked by the rise of increasingly differentiated professions (lawyers and 
politicians, economists and scientists, etc.) as well as interest groups. Arguably, their input into political and 
legal decision-making is more decisive than we like to think. Hence, for example, the reticence of Parliaments 
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critique is becoming increasingly relevant what with the constant talk of crisis of legitimacy 
and trust in government. As many now talk of imploding political sovereignty (say, in 
Greece) as well aas protracted legal exceptionalism (for example, wherever, open-ended 
states of emergency have been declared), it is easier to be persuaded by the critics that ours 
is not a culture of legal and/or political krisis (Gr: decision) but of perpetual crisis requiring 
not principled decision/judgement but management. Said differently, Agamben’s challenge 
is that for over two millennia of western history, behind the ‘façade’ of (legally or politically 
defined) sovereignty there is anomic administration without government.7 This alleged 
historical gradual passage from principled krisis/decision to the ‘economic,’ flexible and, 
ultimately, anomic management of interminable crises, casts in a new light the topic at 
hand.  
 
Wilkinson (2017)8, after a substantial review of the relevant literature, identifies the 
‘relation’ of compassion to law (and, we could add, to politics, too) as a perennially 
controversial one.  That is, law and compassion neither merge nor separate, remaining 
locked together in a way that invites not resolution and synthesis but constant management 
of controversy. The suspicion arises that the perpetual controversy regarding the ‘relation’ 
of law (and politics) to compassion, and more generally regarding the relation of reason and 
affect, is, perhaps not best understood as a dialectic (that can actually lead to a more 
complete understanding of judgement and decision on suffering). Rather, the controversy 
can be said to function as a permanent source of dispute and tension which, thus, occasions 
ever more oikonomia namely the prevalence of administrative over legal or political 
rationality. In fact, as the critics of the ‘law and emotion’ literature today elaborate (see 
below), the various ‘economies of compassion’ that accompany contemporary Western 
                                                                                                                                                       
to remove many historical ‘prerogatives’ of the Executive but also to legislate so-called framework Acts’ that 
leave wide discretionary powers to the executive (e.g. in pardoning criminals, waging ‘humanitarian wars or 
choosing to save private banks from bankruptcy by using public funds) subject only to the advice of 
bureaucrats who derive their legitimacy neither from democracy nor from law but from their expertise.  
 
7
 For one contemporary example of the discussion of our advanced stage in replacing law and politics by 
management in all but name see for example, Somek (2010, pp. 267-287). 
8
 ‘…the controversy about compassion might well be identified as a constant companion to law; or perhaps it is 
more accurate to portray this relationship as one in which law […] is fatefully set in a position where it is made 
to negotiate with the social meaning and morality of compassion’ Wilkinson (2017, p. xxx)  
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legal and political practices can be seen as offering no more than a moral gloss to anomic 
biases and exceptions that frequently lead – in fact, but also, not seldom, by intention – to 
horrific consequences or/and to anomic preferentialism/patronage, for example, in the 
development aid industry that (allegedly) perpetuates dependencies of south to north even 
after de-colonization.  
 
Thus, for example, few Greeks today would accept that the violation of EU’s own rules 
(prohibiting helping member states address the results of their own violation of Eurozone’s 
acceptable deficit levels) in order to ‘save’ Greece from official bankruptcy was mostly, if at 
all, an act of compassionate solidarity. Most see it as a means of putting Greece in the 
position of a ‘protectorate’. Irrespectively of where one stands on this, it is difficult to deny 
that, as administrative/managerial logic prevails, clarity on issues that are central to 
philosophy, ethics, political science and jurisprudence in this regard is hard to find. For 
another example, on the level of international law and relations no one is in position to 
categorically state why a humanitarian intervention is truly justifiable here but not there, or 
whether its illegitimacy under international law can still be excused by reference to its 
humanitarian motives when confronted with millions of dead and displaced people that 
constitute the intervention’s ‘collateral damage.’ In national law, too, it is an impossible task 
to ascertain solid grounds for compassion in, say, key medical law cases. Is compassion at all 
relevant when a court is confronted with an insensate permanently vegetating patient and 
the dispute between a Catholic nurse who considers any life as ‘sacred’ and the doctor and 
relatives who wish to offer the patient an easy-way out as in the aforementioned Bland 
case? As far as we know, the very definition of death that western courts use (in that case 
and beyond) was made up in the late sixties not on the basis of some scientific discovery but 
on pragmatic reasons.9 
 
It is in the light of this confusion that I understand how it is possible that, today, 
‘compassion’ is appropriated on behalf of both liberal and conservative political agendas, 
and used as a pretext to promote the extension both of leftist state welfare policies as well 
                                                 
9
 As Peter Singer explains the re-definition of death from cardiac- to brain-death  happened in response to new 
technologies  that had made it possible to keep artifically alive patients whose consciousness had been 
irretrievably lost  but whose vital organs could now be used as transplants (Singer, 1996). 
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as neo-liberal ethics of self-reliance (Amble, 2011). It is always important to note the actual 
prevailing conditions in which debates take place and the same of course holds true of the 
law/compassion debate. In this regard I note how in the rich Global North immediate 
exposure to suffering and death is rare (for example, critically ill and dead relatives are 
quickly isolated as opposed to pre-modern customs of mourning the dead at home10).  Also 
no pre- or extra-legal compassion is actually allowed (for instance, suicide is permissible but 
assisted suicide is prescribed in most jurisdictions even in cases of the terminally ill). On the 
other hand, however, media-tised, graphic reports of specific distant sufferings, carefully 
contrived to elicit shock and upset are ubiquitous, and often instrumental for the crafting of 
public opinion so as to focus on specific causes and campaigns.   
 
In the context of such abundant compassion-by-proxy, carefully manipulated by both 
governmental powers and non-governmental organizations eager for donations much of 
which go towards their operational costs, some, like Martha Nussbaum, see a need for 
cultivating an ‘intelligence of compassion,’ while others find that this task is compromised 
because emotional experience is all but confined to ephemeral ‘intensities’ or fleeting 
‘sensations’ (Woodward, 2002, p. 224).   Moreover, ours is a culture of unstoppable 
commodification, where it is possible to buy a ‘fair trade’ coffee from a multinational 
company thus indulging the fantasy that by doing so one has discharged a ‘political’ duty 
inside a new ‘cosmopolitan political community’ sustained by globalized compassionate 
sentiment towards instances of suffering that receive media coverage. Whereas some see 
the advent of a new ‘empathic civilization’ others note that the routine exposure to graphic 
scenes of human suffering from one’s television or computer makes people feel politically 
powerless and frustrates and denies any dispensation to true compassion (Boltanski, 2012 
[1990]); one thinks of those ‘likes’ in facebook of postings relating to various tragedies or 
injustices. Yet others, such as Slavoj Žižek, see in such ephemeral modern humanitarianism 
the actual preclusion of any genuine commitment to radical, structural social change.11  
 
                                                 
10
 See, for example, P. Woodrow Nurisng Accutely Ill Adults (Routledge, 2016), p. 221. 
11
 Žižek makes this claim in various documentaries such as The Pervert’s Guide to Ideology (2012). In short he 
identifies a new trend in modern capitalism: marketers tell us we can achieve personal redemption not 
through hard work and amassing savings, but by consuming eco-friendly products, fair trade goods, or 
products that yield some kind of charitable dividends.  
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As populations display ‘compassion fatigue’ and, inversely, public opinion falls prey to 
carefully crafted plays on compassion, 12 Agamben’s skepticism that ethics, politics and law 
have fallen prey to management and manipulated consensus-making, seems to have more 
explanatory power rather than Levinas’ appeal to a universal ethics of ‘anarchic 
compassion.’ The latter refers to a fundamental, pre-political and pre-legal, ‘anarchic,’ 
ethical right to show compassion on the (very un-Hobbesian) understanding that without 
such ‘ethical proximity’ there could be no politics of law, a debt that legal and political 
orders ‘tend to forget’. But in the light of the genealogy of Christian government as 
presented by Agamben said ‘ethical right’ appears compromised since law and politics are 
themselves substituted by bio-political processes of social control and management of 
populations that include the manipulation of compassion.  
 
In sum: Levinas speaks of an existential drama that involves ethically demanded 
‘anarchic’ compassion and ‘infinite’ personal responsibility for directing this compassion to 
some but not others. Behind this drama lies Levinas’s conviction that neither liberal nor 
Marxian humanists can relate to: occupying ‘a place under the sun’ can never be 
‘righteous’13 in as much as one enjoys it instead of another,  even If I hold a legal title to it 
and even if I do welcome and share with some others. Both liberal and Marxian economies 
of compassion repress alterity and infinite responsibility whereas the Levinasian idea of 
compassion as persecution maintains the asymmetry and distance constitutive of the 
non-totalizing relation to the other. Following Agamben, however, one could say that this 
drama of anarchic compassion and infinite responsibility has been appropriated by 
impersonal, anomic, perpetual management.  
 
Characteristically modern humanitarianism can be easily stripped of its ethical, legal and 
political significance and, instead, be suspected as yet another feature of a society of 
spectacle, to use Guy Debord’s phrase, in which manipulated public opinion (appearing as 
genuine democratic ‘consensus’) is seduced by simulacra of compassion – be they of the 
                                                 
12
 E.g., S. D. Moelller Compassion Fatigue How the Media Sell Disease, Famine, War and Death (Routledge 
1999) 
13
 Levinas, E. Is it Righteous to Be? (Palo Alto, Stanford University Press, 2001). 
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liberal or the Marxian variety – and  provisionally accepts unprincipled exercises of public 
power often in the form of legal exceptionalism but also political u-turns and broken 
promises. It has even been suggested that humanitarianism is  ‘sold’ to the masses as a form 
of ‘the pornography of pain’, a way of relating portrayals of other humans’ suffering as a 
‘delicious horror’ (Rozario, 2003). In any case, any attempt to suggest that compassion 
should play a bigger role in public affairs can easily be attacked as enhancing a situation of 
expedient anomie. Consider the episode in 2016 when the televised cries of a Palestinian 
refugee child embarrassed the German Chancellor who had just given said child a televised 
lesson in Kantian morality while explaining to her why she could not stay in Germany: the 
politician decided to suspend the ‘Dublin Treaty’, first in connection to that one girl, then to 
as many refugees as the German economy could absorb before, finally re-closing the 
borders. In these circumstances, Levinas’ ethical thesis that law (and politics) are ‘born’ to 
anarchic compassion which then ‘forget’ their provenance, must be revisited and 
questioned in view of the thesis that the real triumph of our era is not of the rule of law 
or/and democracy but of oikonomia/anomic management falsely presented as principled 
exercise of sovereignty. In bio-political settings – where the polis is in fact substituted by 
oikos, and law (and politics) by administration and crisis management – the ‘remembering’ 
and ‘forgetting’ of compassion occurs incessantly, their ‘controversy’ kept alive, so as to 




I have presented two perspectives, which are difficult to reconcile but I hope, useful to 
juxtapose. In conclusion, allow me to re-present each with an example from my personal 
experience. Holidaying on a rented yacht in the sea between the Greek islands the Turkish 
coast in August 2015, we came across one of the overcrowded inflatable dinghies on which 
Syrian refugees were making their perilous trip to Europe. Our skipper called the Greek 
coast guard who ordered him not to allow any refugees on board (which is considered 
Greek territory) and, instead, to wait for them who would arrest them. As hours passed and 
the children were crying the skipper and we decided to let some on-board. From a 
Levinasian point of view this compassionate defiance of the law is ethically warranted: 
diachronically speaking there can be no organized society without welcoming the stranger 
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and prioritizing her suffering. But from a synchronic point of view other questions arise: 
were we not, by allowing these people aboard, not contributing to an economy of 
compassion that includes, say, the humanitarian interventions of the West in some parts of 
the Middle East – which led to unintended disasters such as the rise of fundamentalism and 
civil war – and the non-intervention in the Syrian civil war? Could it be that we had been 
particularly influenced by the sight of Chancellor Merkel on TV making a temporary u-turn in 
her policy and allowing a certain number of refugees in Germany against the Dublin Treaty 
just before re-closing the border? Were we being ‘ethically anarchic’ or duped by economies 
and spectacles of compassion?  
 
For Levinas, ethical compassion for the proximate other ‘as the only one that 
matters’ is not fundamentally based on empathy (which some have less than others) nor on 
general, moral, legal or political duty; it is, rather, the sign of inescapable, inexhaustible 
responsibility for the ‘scandal’ of suffering which is always, in each instance, too much and 
too meaningless, beyond theodicy and causality. As such it is the sine qua non of sociality on 
the basis of which moral, legal and political orders – religious or secular – are built. This 
suggests that law and politics must recognize the subject’s ‘relation’ to the idea of infinity 
which is ‘not in fact a relation’ but an experience of the anarchy of the other’s alterity and 
uniqueness even if the price is the breaking of law’s self-same identity and the shaming of 
the egoism of politics of self-interest. In jurisprudence these ideas have both generated 
deconstructive readings (for instance, my discussion of the Bland case earlier) and 
reconstructive proposals (for instance, the aforementioned position by Manderson that we 
should substitute un-chosen obligations as the basis of law instead of individual rights, 
freedom, autonomy and contract). Do such readings ‘break’ with the western economic-
theological political tradition Agamben describes? The latter’s investigations point to a 
Western paradigm of anomic governmentality, derivative of a theological past, which 
suggests that what Levinas calls ‘ethical anarchy’ has been captured by economic rationality 
and endless processes of anomic management that are equally free of ethical constraints as 
they are from legal and political decision.  
 
 I fear that Manderson’s reconstructive approach, commendable as it may be, is not 
able to dislodge the depressing reality Agamben exposes. Manderson’s proposal is, in my 
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opinion, nostalgic of pre-Christian or non-Christian pre-modern traditions that western-led 
modernity has swept aside; the primacy and excess of responsibility over rights and of 
ethics over law has been used before, for instance in order to evoke a contrast between 
responsibility-centred Jewish law and a rights-based western model of law; 14 there is little 
to add here apart that this retraces a distinction that has, by now, been contained in the 
globalised occidental paradigm postulating an economic relation between all ‘positive’ and 
all ‘natural’ laws the tension of which is structured by the idea of a sovereign working  on 
the advice of his managerial staff. This suspicion also casts its shadow on those within so-
called ‘critical jurisprudence’ who invoke absolute ethical responsibility both to denote the 
deficiency of law without justice and to call on us to assume the all-compassing, extra-legal 
responsibility before ‘the Other’. Levinas, by contrast, deliberately described ambiguously 
the relation of ethical compassion to principles of legal or political justice, and more 
generally of transcendental ethics to immanent law/politics, of infinity to finitude. This, in 
my understanding, means that there can be no closure or synthesis: we cannot synchronize 
compassion and law; instead there remains only the scandal of human suffering that we 
have not yet tendered to. Yet it is precisely the hallmark of Western economic political 
theology-cum-secular governmentalty to identify autonomy and sovereignty with the 
perpetual management of such binary ‘relations’ as between ethics and law/politics, 
transcendence and immanence, natural law and positive law, affect and reason, compassion 
and adherence to rules/policies. My fear is that what Levinas called the ethical anarchy of 
compassion of one for the other-as-Other, and which must result in ever greater 
responsibility, has, in the western paradigm, been collapsed into the notion that the tension 
between established legal and political orders and universal ethics both requires and 
justifies constant processes of anomic management that allow for opportunistic legal and 






                                                 
14
 R. Cover  (1987) Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order M 5 J. Law & Religion 65. 
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